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A Primer on 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) and
its use in Alternative Billing

Methods in Bankruptcy
by Robert J. Landry, III*
and
James R. Higdon**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Compensation of attorneys and professionals' in the bankruptcy field
is one of the most written about areas in bankruptcy law. Professionals,
both familiar and unfamiliar with the mandates of the Bankruptcy
Code2 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,3 are having an
increasingly difficult time obtaining approval for the envisioned
compensation. Problems generally do not arise for debtors' attorneys in
the run-of-the-mill Chapter 7 case or Chapter 13 case. Flat fees are
charged in most of these cases, and applications to employ debtors'

* Attorney, United States Bankruptcy Administrator's Office, Northern District of
Alabama. Former Law Clerk to the Honorable James S. Sledge, United States Bankruptcy
Judge, Northern District of Alabama. (University of North Alabama (B.S., 1991; University
of Alabama School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994).
** Law Clerk, Honorable William Greendyke, United States Bankruptcy Judge,
Southern District of Texas. Former Law Clerk to the Honorable James S. Sledge, United
States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Alabama (University of Louisville (B.S.,
1991); University of Alabama School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994).
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily
those of the United States Bankruptcy Administrator or the United States Bankruptcy
Court.
1. As that term is used in 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1994).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2599 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C. and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the
"Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].
3. FED. R. BANKR. P. (1994) [hereafter referred to as "Rule" or "Rules"].
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4
attorneys are not filed. Therefore, retention orders are not entered.
However, outside the run-of-the-mill Chapter 7 or 13 case, in Chapter 11
cases, or when an attorney or professional is hired for a special purpose
under section 327(e), problems regarding the particular compensation
may arise.
In the past, most courts used a traditional fee arrangement based
upon reasonable hours and a reasonable rate, commonly referred to as
the "lodestar"5 approach, when approving fees. Because the lodestar
method is not always the desired fee arrangement,6 professionals are
increasingly attempting to use various fee arrangements,7 which in the
past were not commonly used by bankruptcy professionals. However, in
the bankruptcy arena, these nonlodestar fee arrangements are confusing,
inconsistently applied, and potentially dangerous to professionals.
Section 328(a) is a useful tool with alternative fee arrangements.
Section 328' allows professionals to obtain court approval of the

4. In Chapter 7 cases, the debtors' attorneys' only obligation is to make the appropriate
disclosures required by section 329 and Rule 2016. There is no statutory authority for the
entry of retention orders for Chapter 7 debtors' attorneys.
Likewise, in most Chapter 13 cases an application to employ the debtor's attorney is not
filed. Thus, the entry of a retention order will not come into play. The debtors' attorney's
only obligation is to make the appropriate disclosures required by section 329 and Rule
2016. Furthermore, in Chapter 13 cases, most courts have implemented local rules or
procedures that set the initial fees. This in turn allows debtors' attorneys to predict with
relative accuracy their fee. See In re Shamburger, 189 B.R. 965, 973 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1995); In re Watkins, 189 B.R. 823, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Pineloch Enters., 192
B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996).
However, it appears that, pursuant to the concurrent powers the Chapter 13 debtor has
with the trustee under section 1304, the debtor has the power to employ its attorney under
section 327, just as the trustee, and perhaps the debtor, is required to seek authority to
employ an attorney. The authors have been unable to find an answer to explain why
applications to employ Chapter 13 debtors' attorneys are not filed and retention orders not
issued. The Chapter 13 attorney will receive compensation under section 330, which seems
to require that professionals be employed under section 327.
5. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Outside of statutory fee cases,
attorneys often use a variation of a lodestar method of billing clients by charging their
clients an hourly rate, i.e. "time-based billing."
6. See infra note 26 for problems associated with the lodestar approach. For an
overview of inherent problems with "time-based" billing in general, see WILLIAM G. Ross,
THE HONEST HouR, THE ETHics OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (Caroccina
Academic Press 1996).
7. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) provides:
The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the
court's approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional
person under section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any
reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an
hourly basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding such terms and
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particular terms and conditions of employment at the beginning of a
case. The preapproval of the terms and conditions under section 328
minimizes problems at the time the application for compensation is filed
because bankruptcy courts must apply the terms of employment as
approved, unless the terms prove to have been improvident in light of
developments unanticipated at the time of entry of the retention order.9
This provides professionals a tremendous benefit: predictability of their
compensation. However, professionals must properly seek and obtain a
retention order under section 328(a) at the outset of their employment
to enjoy the benefit of pre-approved terms and conditions.
The difficulty is that many lawyers and judges do not understand, or
even realize, the impact' ° of the useful tool provided in section 328(a).
This generalization does not apply to all jurisdictions or bars; however,
at the very least it appears that there is great confusion regarding the
impact of section 328(a), particularly at the time of the application for
compensation. This Article analyzes the history of section 328(a), its use
and effect, and various alternative fee arrangements which have
developed in bankruptcy practice.

II.

EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION OF PROFESSIONALS GENERALLY

To insure independence and protect the estate, section 327 requires
that all employed professionals be approved by the court.1 To obtain

conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation
provided under such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of
developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such
terms and conditions.
9. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
10. The authors have not performed a scientific study as to the number of attorneys
and courts using section 328(a). However, based on first-hand experience, the lack of a
body of comprehensive case law correctly using section 328(a), the failure of the leading
bankruptcy treatises to fully analyze this section, and few, if any, articles carefully
analyzing it, section 328(a) is not widely used. When it is used, it does not appear to
provide the fullest benefit for the professional, estate, and the court. At least one other
commentator has recognized the infrequency with which section 328(a) is used. See Craig
B. Cooper, The Priorityof PostpetitionRetainers, Carve-Outs, and Interim Compensation
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2337, 2343 (April 1994).
11. See, e.g., In re Rheam of Ind., Inc., 133 B.R. 325, (E.D. Pa. 1991), on remand 137
B.R. 151, vacated 142 B.R. 698 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (advance approval of professional is
required to allow court to ensure the integrity, experience, and competence of the
professional seeking to be employed); In re Weibel, Inc., 176 B.R. 209 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)
(professional must show competence to act on behalf of estate and that such professional
is disinterested); In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 936 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)
(professional must be approved by court if playing role in reorganization of estate).
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approval, an application must be filed by the trustee, debtor in
possession, or the committee, 12 setting forth various details pursuant
to Rule 2014."1 The professional seeking employment has the burden
of making a complete and candid disclosure, in a verified statement, of
all facts pertinent to the court's decision to approve employment. 14 It
is the responsibility of the professional to make sure that all relevant
connections have been brought to the court's attention"1 because it is
only after complete disclosure that the court can make an informed
decision regarding the professional's proposed employment."
Based upon the application and verified statement, the court applies
the standard set forth in section 327 to determine if the particular
professional employment should be allowed. 7 The standard applied is

12. 11 U.S.C. § 327 provides for the employment of professionals by the trustee.
Section 1102 provides the Chapter 11 debtor the same power as that held by the trustee.
Section 1103 provides committees the authority to employ professionals.
13. Rule 2014 provides:
An order approving the employment of attorneys, accountants, appraisers,
auctioneers, agents, or other professionals pursuant to § 327, § 1103, or § 1114 of
the Code shall be made only on application of the trustee or committee. The
application shall be filed and, unless the case is a chapter 9 [sic] municipality
case, a copy of the application shall be transmitted by the applicant to the United
States trustee. The application shall state the specific facts showing the necessity
for the employment, the name of the person to be employed, the reasons for the
selection, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed arrangement for
compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in
the office of the United States trustee. The application shall be accompanied by
a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, or any other party in interest, their
respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person
employed in the office of the United States trustee.
14. See, e.g.-, Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting In re
Huddleson, 120 B.R. 399, 400-01 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990) ("The case law is clear that the
burden of disclosure is upon 'the person making the statement [of qualification for
employment] to come forward with facts pertinent to eligibility and to make candid and
complete disclosure.'")); In re Prudhomme, 152 B.R. 91, 1105 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1993) (The
court held the applicant has the burden of disclosure.).
15. See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc., 175 B.R. 525,533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing
Rome, 19 F.3d at 58-60; In re Glenn Elec. Sales, 99 B.R. 596, 599 (D.N.J. 1988); Diamond
Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Diamond Lumber, Inc.), 88 B.R. 773,
776 (N.D. Tex. 1988)).
16. In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135 B.R. 78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 327 provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's
approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers,
or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to
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determined by the nature of the employment sought, that is, general
counsel"8 or special counsel.'" Once the requirements of section 327
are satisfied, the fee arrangement must be considered.
The professional and the court have two alternatives in establishing
the fee arrangement." One approach is to request a retention order
under section 328 that fixes the terms and conditions of the employment.
The other approach is to request approval to be employed, reserving
compensation issues to the time of filing the fee application pursuant to
Rule 2016(a)2' and sections 330 or 331.22 In such situations, at the
time of filing the fee application, the court applies section 330 to award
a reasonable amount of compensation 23 and reviews the other factors
in section 330(a)(3)(A)-(E) to assure they have been complied with.
These factors essentially are a codification of the lodestar calculation,
which is the primary method used to determine the reasonable

the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee
in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title.
(e) The trustee, with the court's approval, ,may employ, for a specified special
purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney
that has represented the debtor, if in the best interest of the estate, and if such
attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the
estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed.
18. Section 327(a) sets forth the standard to determine if the applicant can be employed
as "general" counsel to the trustee or debtor-in-possession.
19. Section 327(e) sets forth the standard to determine if the applicant can be employed
as "special" counsel to the trustee or debtor-in-possession.
20. See In re National Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The court must
therefore set the compensation award either according to § 328 or § 330.").
21. Rule 2016 provides, in pertinent part:
an entity seeking interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of
necessary expenses.., shall file an application setting forth a detailed statement
of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incured, and (2) the
amount requested ....
The requirements of this subdivision shall apply to an
application for compensation for services rendered ....
22. 11 U.S.C. § 330 provides that "the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103- (A) reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered . . . ." (signifying application for compensation
following employment). Section 331 provides for interim compensation to persons employed
under sections 327 or 1103.
23. In re Central Fla. Metal Fabrication, Inc., 207 B.R. 742,748 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997)
("To be awarded in a bankruptcy context, attorney fees must not only be reasonable, they
must also meet the criteria set forth in Section 330(a).").

542

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

compensation in a bankruptcy case,24 and is usually the starting point
for courts in crafting any appropriate attorney fee award.25
Which approach is used depends greatly on the particular bankruptcy
court where the case is pending. As with much of bankruptcy practice,
the particular procedures and practices regarding the employment and
compensation of professionals is localized. Therefore, professionals
should always consult local rules or policies prior to filing an application
to be employed.

III. EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 328(A)
A.

History of Section 328(a)

Prior to section 328, there was no mechanism for court approval of the
compensation at the time of such approval of professional's employment.
Compensation was governed by former Bankruptcy Rule 219(c)(1), which
provided that a professional who rendered services to the bankrupt
estate was entitled to reasonable compensation. Contracts for employment on a percentage fee basis between a trustee in bankruptcy and an

24. See, e.g., In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1991); Grant v. Schumann Tire &
Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Manoa Fin. Co., 853 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1988); In re Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1987); Boston & Maine Corp. v. Moore, 776
F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1985); Herman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1985); Lindy Bros.
Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973).
25. See, e.g., Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Central Fla.
Metal, 207 B.R. at 748 ("The starting point in crafting an appropriate attorney fees award
is to multiply a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours worked, thus arriving at the
'lodestar.'").
Although lodestar is the primary method for awarding fees in bankruptcy and is usually
the starting point, there are several inherent problems with the lodestar compensation
method. The biggest problem by far is uncertainty. First, the court may not approve the
hourly rate envisioned by the professional. In fact, the court may determine that the
hourly rate should be significantly lower than counsel anticipates. This leads to a
reduction in fees. Conversely, the court may determine the hours spent working on the
case were not reasonable and reduce them accordingly.
Second, problems can arise with the lodestar method in situations wherein the hourly
rate, multiplied by reasonable hours, will not be sufficient to induce counsel to represent
the case. This is especially true in cases related to the bankruptcy wherein counsel
operates in courts other than the bankruptcy courts. In the private market, these types
of cases are almost routinely handled on other types of fee arrangements, namely,
contingency-fee arrangements.
Third, from an administrative point of view for the bankruptcy courts, "setting fees in
large cases pursuant to the lodestar hybrid" is burdensome without some assistance, and
the lodestar method is "questionable in its efficacy." In re Home Express, Inc., 213 B.R.
162, 165 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997).
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attorney were often invalidated.26
The relevant inquiry was not
whether the fee contract was per se invalid, but whether the compensation provided by the agreement was reasonable under former Rule
219.27

The guiding principles under the old rule were conservation of the
estate and economy of administration.28
Under this standard, the

courts set attorney fees based on notions of "equity and fairness to
creditors and on conservation of the estate."29 The reasoning was that
professionals employed under section 240 of the Bankruptcy Act were

"public officers" and thus, not permitted to be compensated on the same
scale as those privately employed.3 ° Thus, the bankruptcy judges were
to award fees "at the lower end of the spectrum of reasonableness."31
The effect was to allow attorney fees only. 2 "These principles, however, discouraged practitioners from entering the bankruptcy field, where
they would have earned substantially less than in other areas of

practice."33

This, in turn, led to a perceived stigma that "only less

qualified counsel in the bankruptcy bar worked for debtors due to the
reduced compensation."3 4 As a result, estates were ill-served by lessable bankruptcy specialists, and the costs of inefficient management
were passed on to creditors.3 5 "In 1978, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a) and expressly provided that compensation should be reasonable

and at least in part based on the cost of comparable services."36

26. Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 575 (1923).
27. Carter v. Woods, 433 F. Supp. 291, 293 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
28. See, e.g., In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 18 B.R. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re River
Landings, Inc., 180 B.R. 701, 704 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) (citing In re Manoa Fin. Co.,
853 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1988)). See also In re Farley, Inc., 156 B.R. 203, 210 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1993) (The court noted that "[p]rior to the enactment of [the Bankruptcy Code],
economy of administration was the paramount consideration in determining attorney fee
awards.").
29. In re Hunt's Health Care, Inc., 161 B.R. 971, 975 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993).
30. See River Landings 180 B.R. at 704 n.4 (citing Manoa, 853 F.2d at 689).
31. Farley, 156 B.R. at 210 (quotingln re United States Golf Corp., 639 F.2d 1197, 1201
(5th Cir. 1981) (quoting In re First Colonial Corp., 544 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977))).
32. In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987). See also Official Creditors' Comm.
of Fox Mkts., Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1964); Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571,
576 (1923).
33. Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47.
34. Hunt's Health Care, 161 B.R. at 975 n.1 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, 133 B.R. 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
35. See generally In re Hunt's Health Care, Inc., 161 B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993);
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 330 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6286.
36. Robert J. Landry, III & James R. Higdon, Ethical Considerationsin Appointment
and Compensation of an Attorney for a Chapter11 Debtor-in-Possession,66 Miss. L.J. 355
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Congress abandoned the economy of administration of the estate
standards in enacting the Bankruptcy Code"7 and courts are "no longer
bound by pre-Code notions of frugality and economy in fixing fee.""8
The new standard served two important purposes, namely, that
compensation be fair and reasonable. In order to not deter "competent
counsel from entering the bankruptcy area, attorneys should receive in
bankruptcy matters what they would receive on the open market."8 9
It is in accord with this section 330(a) market approach to compensation
that different fee arrangements were expressly sanctioned by section
328(a).40
B. Application for Employment Under Section 328(a)
1. Fixing Terms is Discretionary. The starting point for any
award of nonlodestar fee arrangements is the basic premise that there
is no authority requiring a court to approve fee arrangements simply
because the professional anticipated, or even contracted with the client,
on how compensation would be computed. However, section 328(a)
provides a procedural mechanism for professionals seeking court
authorization of the terms of compensation at the time of the application
for approval of employment.
"In sharp contrast with the old Bankruptcy Act, section 328(a) now
authorizes the court to preapprove a wide variety of employment

(Winter 1996). "It has been argued that the 1994 amendment to § 330, which makes the
'cost of comparable services' standard one of five nonexclusive factors, may return courts
to apply an economy of administration standard.") See also Kenneth Shapiro & Nancy
Peterman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1994 and Professional Fee Awards, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISOR, Feb. 1995, at 78. However, the amendment will likely have no practical effect
on the law.
37. In re UNR Indus., 986 F.2d 207, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1993).
In enacting section 330, Congress intended to move away from doctrines that
strictly limited fee awards under section 241 [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898] ....
Under section 330 and its legislative history Congress expressed its intent that
compensation in bankruptcy matters be commensurate with the fees awarded for
comparable services in non-bankruptcy cases.
See also In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 19 F.3d 833, 849-51 (3rd Cir. 1994) (The court
recognized this fact while noting that the legislative history is somewhat unclear when not
read in its entirety.).
38. In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987) (citing In re McCombs, 751 F.2d 286,
288 (8th Cir. 1984)).
39. Hunt's Health Care, 161 B.R. at 975 (citing UNR Indus., 986 F.2d at 209). See also
In re Nor-Les Sales, Inc., 32 B.R. 900, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) ("The compensation
awarded should be adequate to provide an incentive for competent and able lawyers to
participate in bankruptcy proceedings and to insure efficient case administration.").
40. See generally 161 B.R. at 975; 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).
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arrangements between the attorney and trustee."41 At least two courts
have held that courts are required to approve the proposed terms and
conditions of a professional's employment at the front end as part of the
application for employment, rather than defer the approval of the terms
and conditions pending the court's normal application and allowance
procedures concerning fees.42
The reasoning of these courts defies the basic tenets of statutory
construction. For instance, in In re Dividend Development Corp., ' the
court reasoned that section 328 imposes a condition on a court entering
a retention order approving a professional's employment under section
327. 44 The court further reasoned that since section 328 was a
necessary condition, a reasonableness analysis of the fee arrangement
was required at the beginning of the case.45 Section 328(a) provides in
pertinent part:
The trustee,. . . with the court's approval, may employ or authorize the
employment of a professional person under Section 327 or 1103 of this
Title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of
employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a
contingent fee basis. 6
Section 328 clearly states that the trustee may employ professionals on
any reasonable terms, provided the trustee obtains court approval. The
statute does not mandate that the court approve any terms or conditions.
The statute simply provides the trustee the procedural mechanism to
seek such approval from the court. If such approval is not sought, there
is no requirement that the court consider the particular terms or
conditions at the time of the employment application, much less a
requirement that it approve the terms and conditions of the proposed
employment as a condition to the employment.
The court's second conclusion in Dividend, that the authorization in
section 328 to modify fees if such terms prove "to have been improvident

41. Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; see also In re Olympia Holding Corp., 176 B.R. 962, 965
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("In contrast to pre-code law, § 328 allows the court to pre-approve
various types of employment arrangements including contingency agreements.") (citing
§ 328(a); In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44 (D. Minn. 1987))).
42. See, e.g., In re Heritage Mall Assocs., 184 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995) ("This
court should not have approved the employment of the firm without approving the fee
agreement that had been entered into between the debtors and the firm as reasonable.");
In re Dividend Dev. Corp., 145 B.R. 651, 655 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
43. Dividend Dev. Corp., 145 B.R. 651.
44. Id. at 655.
45. Id.

46. 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).
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in light of developments not capable of being anticipated" at the time of
fixing the terms and conditions, which anticipates the court making a
reasonableness determination at the beginning of the case, 47 is partially
correct. If the trustee seeks approval of the terms and conditions at the
beginning of the professional's employment, the court will have to make
some type of a reasonableness determination at the beginning of the
case. However, this has no impact on any requirement of the court to
enter section 328(a) retention orders. Such orders are in the court's
discretion. There is no requirement in the Code dictating that courts fix
the terms and conditions of the employment of any professional.4"
Thus, to read such a requirement in the Code is judicial legislation.4 9
2. Retention Order with Fixed Terms. It is critical for professionals who wish to afford themselves of the benefits of preapproved
terms under section 328(a) to obtain a retention order expressly
authorizing the employment under the desired terms prior to the
services being rendered5 0 This will usually require expressly asking
for such an order in the employment application. In some districts, such
orders are entered routinely; however, this is not a universal practice.
Professionals should beware of retention orders which mention section
328(a) but do not set out specific terms or approve the specific terms
requested. Without a retention order expressly authorizing the employment under specific terms and conditions under section 328(a), an order
with boilerplate language approving employment5 ' only establishes that

47. Dividend Dev. Corp., 145 B.R. at 655 (interpreting the language of § 328(a).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).
49. However, it should be noted there is one instance when the terms and conditions
must be set. Rule 6005 provides that "[t]he order of the court approving the employment
of an appraiser or auctioneer shall fix the amount or rate of compensation." This provision
is logically read to require that when the professional seeking employment is an auctioneer
or appraiser, the court must enter the retention order pursuant to section 328(a). The
court is not required to approve the terms as requested; however, the retention order must
fix the terms and conditions. The exact terms and conditions will be set by the court's
determination of what is reasonable.
50. See, e.g., In re Olympia Holding Co., 176 B.R. at 965 ("[Section] 328 must apply
when the court approves a fee arrangement prior to services being rendered.") (citing
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1991);
In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44)); In re Donaldson, No. C-95-4528 FMS, 1996 WL 161677, at *2
(N.D. Ca. Apr. 2, 1996) (citing Puget, 924 F.2d at 960) ("Section 328(a), therefore, 'only
applies where the court has validated a previous fee arrangement ....").
51. Such standard orders are routinely entered. For example, the bankruptcy judge in
the Western District of Pennsylvania entered such a standard order authorizing an
applicant's retention which stated that "debtors in profession[ I be and hereby are
authorized to retain the firm of [Zolfo, Cooper & Co.] to perform the services as set forth
in the foregoing Motion and Affidavit of Frank John Zolfo." Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v.

19991

ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS

547

the attorney has met the specifications of section 327 and is allowed to
represent the estate. Such an order, however, does not bind a court to
the particular terms and conditions of compensation recited in an
application for employment or otherwise anticipated by the applicant.52
In the case of In re C & P Auto Transport, Inc.," the court noted the
importance of precise language in the order authorizing the professional's employment:
If the order does not expressly and unambiguously state specific terms
and conditions (e.g., specific hourly rates or contingency fee arrangements) that are being approved pursuant to the first sentence of
section 328(a), then the terms and conditions are merely those that
apply in the absence of specific agreement. That leaves the court free
to apply lodestar rates unfettered by the strictures of the second
sentence of 328(a) .. .

Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 262 (3rd Cir. 1995).
52. Id. See also In re Yermakov, 718 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (The contingent fee at
issue and argued by counsel to be approved was executed more than a year before the
bankruptcy petition was filed, and was never preapproved by the bankruptcy court. The
fee award was calculated under the general provisions of section 330; sections 327 and 328
were not implicated); In re Donaldson, No. C-95-4528 FMS, 1996 WL 161677, at * 2
("Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 328(a), a court has the discretion to deviate from the terms
of employment and award a reasonable amount of attorney fees where the terms of
compensation are not pre-authorized."); In re Vaniman Int'l, Inc., 24 B.R. 207 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (previous bankruptcy order denied flat six percent brokerage commission and
required trustee to apply to court for the commission once the sale of property was
completed); Crane Clothing Co. v. Arthur Winer, Inc. (In re Taxman Clothing Co.), 134 B.R.
286, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[Section] 328(a)'s deference does not kick in unless the
appointment order 'expressly and unambiguously state[s] specific terms and conditions (e.g.
specific hourly rates or contingency fee arrangements) that are being approved pursuant
to the first sentence of section 328(a) .....
") (citing In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R.
682, 685 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988)); In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467,473
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (where the contingent fee arrangement had only been agreed to
by the parties, no court approval so no section 328 analysis); In re B.J. Gaff, Inc., 37 B.R.
548 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (no prior agreement or court approval under section 328;
additional fees denied where debtor's counsel was retained for two months, did little more
than file the petition and attend the first creditors' meeting, and had already received fees
in the sum of $10,000); In re Liberal Mkt., Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (fee
application was filed by professional persons appointed under section 327; fee award
determined by section 330); Olympia Holding, 176 B.R. at 965 ("The reasonableness
standard contained in § 330 generally applies when the Court approves the appointment
of a professional but does not specifically approve the terms of employment.") (citing In re
Sergio, 39 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984)).
53. C & P Auto Transp., 94 B.R. at 682; see also Zolfo, Cooper & Co., 50 F.3d at 261
(3rd Cir. 1995).
54. 94 B.R. at 685 n.4.
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This conclusion prevents courts from unintentionally being bound to
specific terms.55 There is no reason why the burden should be on the
court to specify in its order authorizing retention of the professional that
it rejects specific terms and conditions. Instead, the burden rests on the
applicant to ensure the court explicitly notes the terms and conditions
if the applicant expects them to be established at an early point.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court's duty to conduct an independent
examination of fee applications for services rendered," even in the
absence of objections,5" "would be unduly restricted if employment
authorization orders were routinely construed as binding the court to
particular terms" disclosed in the employment application.5 8 If a
retention order simply approves employment of a professional as
requested in the application with no mention of specific terms, reconsideration should be sought requesting the section 328 approval and, if
possible, the-specific terms set out in the employment order.59
The professional should be aware that some courts have held that
evidence of reasonableness of the terms requested should be presented
prior to the entry of a retention order pursuant to section 328. 60 A
hearing may not be required because the application, and disclosures
therein, may be sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of the fee,
particularly in light of the fact that judges are deemed fee experts."s
However, depending on the particular jurisdiction and the exact terms
of the employment, an evidentiary hearing may be required to prove the
reasonableness of the fee arrangement.6 2

55. Id.
56. In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 843 n.8 (3rd Cir. 1994) (collecting
cases). See also Landry & Higdon, supra note 36, at 373-75 n.57.
57. Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 19 F.3d at 843 (court has a duty to review fee application
even in the absence of objections by the U.S. Trustee or parties in interest.) See also
Landry & Higdon, supra note 36, at 373-76 nn. 56-60 and accompanying text.
58. Zolfo, Cooper & Co., 50 F.3d at 262.
59. Id. (citing In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 685 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1988)).
60. See generally In re Westbrooks, 202 B.R. 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re
Dividend Dev. Corp., 145 B.R. 651 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (section 328(a) clearly
anticipates that the court will make a determination as to the reasonableness of a fee
arrangement at the beginning of a case).
61. See, e.g., Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 19 F.3d at 854; Zolfo, Cooper & Co., 50 F.3d at
258; York Int'l Bldg., Inc. v. Chaney, 527 F.2d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 1975); In re TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc., 434 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1970); Mass Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405

F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1968); Bergeson v. Dilworth, 875 F. Supp. 733, 739 (D. Kan. 1995).
62. The scope and extent of the evidence required will vary from judge to judge. Once
the general requirements for employment are satisfied, i.e., section 327 and Rule 2014, and

the nature of the representation is established, the applicant must prove the reasonable-
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C. *Effect and Benefit of a Section 328(a) Retention Order
With a retention order fixing the terms of employment, the fixed terms

are to be applied at the time of the application for compensation. Even
so, the professional must still comply with Rule 2016 and file a fee
application at the end of the case, or file for interim compensation
pursuant to section 331 during the case.63 The application must meet
all the technical requirements of Rule 2016, including stating the
services rendered and time expended.'
This appears to be the case
even if the term or condition approved is a contingency fee or some other
type of fee arrangement not based on the traditional lodestar approach.65 In short, Rule 2016 governs the technical requirements of the

ness of the fee arrangement. At a section 328(a) employment hearing, the "issue of fact"
is the reasonableness of the fee arrangement. If the judge cannot determine the
reasonableness of the fee arrangement on its face, or if the reasonableness requirement is
not satisfied through some other evidence such as affidavits, then the specialized
knowledge of an expert witness may assist the judge in making such a factual determination.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that if "specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact ...

to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ...

may testify

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Expert testimony is usually not a problem,
because quite often, assuming the professional can qualify as an expert, the professional
can offer expert testimony supporting the reasonableness of the fee. Usually the
professional will qualify as an expert because parties rarely object to the professional's
qualifications unless the testimony of the professional itself indicates that the professional
is not qualified to testify as an expert on the reasonableness of the fee arrangement in
question.
63. See Rule 2016 supra note 21 and In re Lotus Properties LP, 200 B.R. 388 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1996) (even in section 328 employment situations, in order to receive compensation, professionals must file fee applications).
64. In re Westbrooks, 202 B.R. 520, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
65. Note, however, that those courts permitting flat fees in Chapter 13 cases without
a full lodestar analysis do not require time records as set forth in Rule 2016. See supra
note 5; In re Shamburger, 189 B.R. 965, 973 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Watkins, 189
B.R. 823, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Costello, 150 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
1992) (The court approved an exception to lodestar in Chapter 13 cases, while recognizing
that Rule 2016 appears to subsume the lodestar formula. The court concluded that the
bankruptcy court has broad discretion in Chapter 13 fee requests, and apparently
concluded such discretion can remove an express requirement of Rule 2016). The authors
are suspect of procedures, whether by local rule or otherwise, that alleviate an express
nondiscretionary requirement of a rule. This appears to be an unauthorized expansion of
the bankruptcy court's authority. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are
prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1994). Rule
9029 provides that the district court may authorize the bankruptcy judges to make rules
of practice and procedure which are not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Rules. The
procedure adopted by those courts not requiring compliance with Rule 2016 is tantamount
to a local rule which abrogates the Federal Rules, and are therefore invalid. Furthermore,
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application for compensation, and section 330(a) provides the framework
for review of all fee applications.6 6 A section 328(a) retention order
only provides the standard for review of the compensation, i.e., whatever
the fixed terms and conditions were in the retention order, not a
reasonableness analysis under section 330(a)(1). 7
In the case when no measure for compensation was determined at the
outset in the retention order, section 330 envisions a reasonableness
determination at the time of the fee application. This usually means an
application of the lodestar analysis. However, with preapproval under
section 328, the court does not have the power to make a reasonableness
review at the end of a case.6" By its own terms, section 330(a) is
"subject to" the limitations set forth in section 328(a).6 9 Sections 330
and 328(a) work in tandem 0 and must be read together. Thus, when
the court has preapproved the terms and conditions of employment
under section 328, section 330(a) provides the "framework for review
while section 328 provides the standard for review."7 The court cannot

"reduce the resulting fee unless the terms of the court's approval 'prove

to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being
anticipated' when approved."72 For example, "section 330(a)(1) does not
supplant section 328(a) and give the judge free reign to void a previously
authorized employment agreement for a percentage fee."73 Most of the
reported decisions that consider this aspect of section 328(a) disallowed

11 U.S.C. § 105(a) does not authorize judges to abrogate a specific rule.
66. In re Circle K Corp., 191 B.R. 426, 431 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996) (The framework for
review of § 330(a) is "expressly subject to the limitations of section 328(a).").
67. Id.
68. Id. See, e.g., In re Pitrat v. Reimers (In re Reimers), 972 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
1992); In re Confections by Sandra, Inc., 83 B.R. 729, 731 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987); In re
Circle K Corp., 165 B.R. 653, 656 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
69. See, e.g., In re Olympia Holding Corp., 176 B.R. 962, 965 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994);
In re Circle K Corp., 191 B.R. 426, 431 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996); In re Cal Farm Supply Co.,
110 B.R. 461,465 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989) ("The compensation provided for in section 330(a)
is subject to section 328(a).").
70. Circle K, 191 B.R. at 431.
71. Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Webb & Daniel, 204 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1997) (quoting In re Westbrooks, 202 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996)). ("The
'standard of review' created by Section 328 requires a finding of improvidence 'in light of
developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and
conditions.'") (citing § 328(a)); see also Circle K, 191 B.R. at 431.
72. In re Olympic Marine Servs., Inc., 186 B.R. 651, 654 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995). See
also Circle K, 191 B.R. at 431 ("Where a bankruptcy court previously approved compensation terms, it cannot subsequently alter those terms unless the original terms were
improvident in light of unanticipated developments.") (citing In re Reimers, 972 F.2d at
1128).
73. In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
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reduction of previously approved fee arrangements .based on the usual
tests for "reasonable compensation" under section 330(a).74 However,
some courts erroneously applied a reasonableness standard to reduce a
contingent fee arrangement.75
This issue was addressed in the case of Pitrat v. Reimers (In re
Reimers).7" The trustee employed an attorney as special counsel for the
estate to prosecute a fraud claim. The fee arrangement between the
trustee and the attorney provided that the attorney would be awarded
compensation of forty percent of the amount recovered for the estate.77
The bankruptcy court approved the employment and the fee agreement
in a retention order.78
The attorney succeeded in recovering $37,871.30 for the estate on the
fraud claim. Thereafter, the attorney filed an application for compensation seeking authorization for the trustee to pay the attorney $15,101.10
(forty percent of the amount recovered). Rather than apply the approved
fee agreement, the bankruptcy court estimated the number of hours the
applicant must have worked and multiplied that number by the
applicant's hourly rate.79
There was no finding of unanticipated
developments that rendered the original terms of employment approved
by the bankruptcy court in the retention order improvident.8 0 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court. However, the United

74. Id. (citations omitted). See also Reimers, 972 F.2d at 1128-29; In re Confections by
Sandra, Inc., 83 B.R. 729, 731 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987); In re Olympia Holding Corp., 176 B.R.
962, 966 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (The bankruptcy court "specifically approved the
employment agreement and its compensation scheme. There [was] no evidence that
unexpected or unforeseen circumstances [had] occurred which cause[d] the approval of the
employment agreement to be improvident. Consequently, the Court [could] not conduct a
§ 330 reasonableness review of the fees requested pursuant to the contract and will grant
the application for fees as calculated pursuant to the employment contract terms.");
Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47-48; Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924
F.2d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. See Begier, Ltd. v. United Jersey Bank, Nos. CIV. A. 93-2085, 88-128425, 1993 WL
315656 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1993). The authors note that even commentators have
erroneouly concluded that a reasonableness review under the factors set forth in section
330 is applicable even when a court has pre-approved the fee arrangement. 2 LAWRENCE
P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, T 328.02[1][f], at 328-18 (15th ed. 1996). In fact, the
primary authority cited for this proposition by Collier applies a correct analysis of the
application of section 328 and rejects the conclusion set forth in Collier. See In re Reimers,
972 F.2d at 1128-29.
76. In re Reimers, 972 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 1127-28.
78. Id. at 1128.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower courts'
decisions."'
The Ninth Circuit held the bankruptcy court erred in "assuming] that
section 330 gave it the power to make a general 'reasonableness' review,
despite the express language of section 328. "82 The Ninth Circuit found
the district court erroneously cited to an earlier Ninth Circuit decision,
Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re Yermakov),"3 as authority for the
bankruptcy court's reduction of the fees requested by the applicant. The
Ninth Circuit distinguished Yermakov because that case did not involve
an arrangement preapproved by the bankruptcy court for payment on a
contingency basis. 84 The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court
to award the applicant compensation under the contingent fee agreement, unless the court "conclude[d] the agreement was 'improvident' in
light of unforeseeable developments." 5
In a very recent case, In re National Gypsum Co.," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit faced a similar question. The
bankruptcy court entered an order of employment "upon the terms and
conditions of that certain engagement letter dated April 16, 1991." 8'
The bankruptcy court also included a statement in the retention order
that it reserved the right to consider and approve the reasonableness of
the fees on a final basis. At the end of the case, the attorney submitted
an application requesting compensation pursuant to the engagement
letter in the amount of $2,400,000.88 At the fee hearing, the bankruptcy court applied a reasonableness standard and reduced the amount
allowed to $2,000,000. The district court affirmed, holding that section
328 was inapplicable because of the extra language in the approval
order. This language, according to the district court, allowed the
bankruptcy court to use a reasonableness standard and not the
improvidence standard set out in section 328.89
The Fifth Circuit ruled that a section 328 retention order could be
modified only upon developments "unforseen when originally approved"
and that bankruptcy courts "must protect those [fee] agreements and

81. Id. at 1129.
82. Id.
83. 718 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
84. Reimers, 972 F.2d at 1129.
85. Id.
86. In re National Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d 861 (5th Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 862.
88. Originally the applicant requested compensation in the amount of $2,825,000 but,
upon objection by the debtor, applicant agreed to the reduced amount of $2,400,000. Id.
89. Id. at 862.
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expectations, once found to have been acceptable."9" The Fifth Circuit
found the additional language included in the retention order did not
remove the order from section 328's provisions, but simply "recited [the
court's] control of the compensation in the event of subsequent and
unanticipated circumstances affecting the reasonableness of that agreed
fee."91 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to award fees in compliance with section 328.92 This case
highlights the power of section 328(a)-once terms of engagement are
approved, courts cannot apply a reasonableness test after the work is
performed and the fee application is filed. The sole statutory basis for
modifying the fee arrangement is that it was improvident when made.
D.

Safety Valve in Section 328(a)

Section 328(a) provides "a safety valve in the event of unpredictable
changes."93 The statute expressly permits the court to award fees at
variance with the terms of its previous order when they "prove to have
been improvident in light of developments unanticipatable" at the time
the compensation agreement was approved.94 The exact meaning of the
term "improvident" as used in section 328(a) is not clear because there
are very few published opinions analyzing it. However, courts generally
have found terms and conditions of employment improvident in two
situations, i.e., when "unpredictable facts or circumstances"95 develop
or "unforeseeable and unexpected circumstances intervene."96 This is
consistent with the definition of "improvidently" as set forth in Black's
Law Dictionary, which defines "improvident" as "[a] judgment, decree,
rule, injunction, etc., when given or rendered without adequate
consideration by the court, or without proper information as to all the

90. Id. at 862-63.
91. Id. at 863.
92. Id.
93. In re Benassi, 72 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
94. Id. (Note, the court was quoting a prior version of section 328(a) which read in
pertinent part ". . . if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light
of developments unanticipatable at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions."
11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1982). The statute now reads "not capable of being anticipated" rather
than "unanticipatable." Id. § 328(a) (1984)); see also In re Olympia Holding Co., 176 B.R.
962, 965 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("This approval [section 328(a)] is subject to provision
which allows the Court to award fees which vary from the terms of a previously approved
contract, when unpredictable facts or circumstances occur after approval of the agreement
upon a finding that the original approval of the agreement terms was improvident.")
(citations omitted).
95. Olympia Holding, 176 B.R. at 965.
96. Benassi, 72 B.R. at 49.
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circumstances affecting it, or based upon a mistaken assumption or
misleading information or advice."97
It is important to note that simply "unanticipated" developments or
circumstances do not warrant a finding of improvidence. Section 328
"allows revision of a fee agreement only if a development was not
capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and
conditions.""8 Whether the event was actually anticipated is immaterial. The relevant inquiry is whether the event was capable-of anticipation."9
Therefore, a simple finding that the professional seeking
compensation did not anticipate a change in circumstances does not
satisfy section 328(a).'0° To alter a fee agreement under section 328,
the bankruptcy court must find that it was not possible for the
professional seeking compensation to anticipate the change in circumstances.' 0'
At least one commentator, Professor Cynthia Baker, criticized the
bankruptcy court's power under section 328(a) to modify a fixed-fee
arrangement with the advantage of hindsight.' 2 Professor Baker's
criticism has validity only if the power to modify a fixed-fee arrangement
is broad and modifications are made merely on hindsight.
However, the power to modify a fixed-fee arrangement is very limited
and applies only when the express conditions in section 328(a) are
satisfied. 1 3 Twenty-twenty vision at the end of the case will not
permit the bankruptcy court to modify the fixed fee."' Professor
Baker also suggests that the power of the court to modify a fixed fee
under section 328(a) limits the power of debtors or committees to retain
professionals except on an hourly basis. 10 5 Professor Baker states:

97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990).
98. Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Webb & Daniel, 204 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1997) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 328(a)).
99. Id. This conclusion is supported by the modifications made to the statute by
Congress. A prior version of section 328(a) read in pertinent part ".. . if such terms and
conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments unanticipatable at the
time of the fixing of such terms and conditions." 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1982). The statute
now reads "not capable of being anticipated" rather than "unanticipatable." Id. § 328(a)
(1994).
A plain reading of the statute, as amended, dictates the conclusion that
"unanticipatable" developments are insufficient to deviate from preapproved terms and
conditions.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also In re Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., 9 B.R. 841, 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1981); Seiler v. First Nat'l Bank of Babbit (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44 (D. Minn. 1987).
102. Cynthia A. Baker, Other People's Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in
Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 55 (Spring 1996).
103. Warrior Drilling& Eng'g Co., 9 B.R. at 847.
104. Benassi, 72 B.R. at 49.
105. Baker, supra note 102, at 55.
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Professionals retained under a contingency fee run the risk that they
will receive nothing. Under both fixed fee and contingency fee arrangements, professionals bear the risk that the engagement will be
unprofitable because the engagement requires more work than
originally predicted. Basic economics suggest professionals will not
accept those risks without receiving a risk premium, i.e., compensation
in excess of amounts they would receive if paid on an hourly basis.
Section 328(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to take that risk
premium away after the fact, and would seem to impair DIPs' and
committees' ability to use alternative fee arrangements to control
costs.106

Professor Baker's general analysis of the risks with certain fee arrangements applies both in and outside of bankruptcy, but the conclusion that
section 328(a) authorizes courts to take the risk premium away after the
fact is a misreading of the statute.
Section 328(a) only takes the risk premium away when the standard
for modification of fixed-fee arrangements in this section is interpreted
broadly and expanded beyond the very limited improvidence standard.
The risks associated with fixing the fee at the outset of representation
do not change simply because of bankruptcy and the power of section
328(a) to modify fee arrangements. When section 328(a) is properly
applied, professionals in bankruptcy cases bear the same risks at the
outset of the representation as in nonbankruptcy contexts, and
bankruptcy professionals are in the same position as nonbankruptcy
professionals. This helps promote the Code's clear intent of having
professionals inside and outside of bankruptcy be compensated
comparably and bear similar risks.107
E.

Expenses and Section 328(a)

It is important to note that expenses are not dealt with under section
328(a). By its own express language, section 328 is a "[l]imitation on
compensation of professional persons." Thus, section 328(a) involves
only limitations on fees or compensation, not expenses.' 0 8 Reimbursement of expenses are governed by the standards set forth in section
330(a)(1)(B) which provide "reimbursement for actual, necessary
expenses." °9

106. Id. at 55-56.
107. Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47.
108. See, e.g., In re Cal Farm Supply Co., 110 B.R. 461,465 (Bankr. E.D. Cal 1989); In
re Chicago Art Glass, Inc., 155 B.R. 180, 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(B) (1994).
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Section 330(a)(1)(B) provides little guidance in determining whether
a particular expense was "necessary," and thus reimbursable. This is
particularly true because there are innumerable potential expenses that
may be reimbursable." 0 Generally, the issue is whether the particular
expense "was incurred because it was required to accomplish the proper
representation of the client.""' If the answer is yes, then the expense
is generally "necessary" under section 330(a)(1)(B), and thus reimbursable." 2 Just as. with compensation requests, the applicant has the
burden of establishing that
the expense was necessary;"' courts will
14
not presume it to be so."
IV. USE OF SECTION 328 AND ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS
The Third Circuit recognizes that the lodestar approach may not
always be the prevailing billing method, and other billing practices in
bankruptcy are emerging. The Third Circuit stated that section 330 "by
no means ossifies the lodestar approach as the point of departure in fee
determinations." 5 "[W]ith the rise of competitive pressures and the
ceaseless evolution of the legal community, we may expect to witness law
practitioners adapt to the changed circumstances by developing
alternative billing practices and methods." 116 The Eleventh Circuit
likewise recognized that the legislative history to section 330(a) indicates
a clear "desire to promote the same billing
practices in bankruptcy cases
17
as in other branches of legal practice."
It is with this flexibility of section 330, and the market approach
embraced therein, that section 328(a) permits professionals to have
alternative fee arrangements addressed and possibly approved at the
outset of the case. In fact, one court wrote that "the flexibility written
into this standard [§ 328(a)] encourages bankruptcy judges to approve

110. Cal Farm Supply Co., 110 B.R. at 465 (citing proposition that reimbursable
expenses include, but certainly are not limited to, meals, word processing, messenger
service, taxi fare, parking, photocopying, postage, express mail services, legal research
computer costs, faxing, and mileage for out-of-town travel).
111. In re The Grabill Corp., 110 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
112. Id.
113. Id. See also In re Convent Guardian Corp., 103 B.R. 937, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989); In re Affinito & Son, Inc., 63 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
114. 103 B.R. at 939.
115. In re Busy Beaver, 19 F.3d 833, 856 (3rd Cir. 1994).
116. Id. (citing Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client
Relationship Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191 (Jan.-Feb. 1994));
Steven Brill, Replacing the Hourly Rate, AM. LAW. at 6 (Sept. 1992); Deborah Graham,
Billing Methods: Firms Begin to Tinker, LEGAL TIMES, May 20, 1985, at 1.
117. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp.), 127 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1997).
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compensation arrangements that reflect market conditions and to
fashion arrangements suitable to the circumstances of the case before
it.""'
Granted, innovative billing strategies should not be tested
through the compensation provisions of the Code. However, once
alternative practices are comfortably established in the realm of
comparable nonbankruptcy legal services, the Code provides the
mechanism for bankruptcy courts to consider such billing practices.' 19
The number of different fee arrangements is limited only by the
imagination. Of course, the standard time-based billing, flat fees, and
contingent fees are the most common arrangements. However, professionals should be cognizant that these type of fee arrangements are not
the only thing that section 328 can be used to establish. Time of
payment, frequency of payments, amount of each payment, frequency of
applications, and hourly rates of professionals are only a few of the
variables section 328 can establish at the beginning of representation.
Professionals, and particularly attorneys, are being creative in
combining the different types of fee arrangements, creating a form of
hybrid fee arrangements for the unique, circumstances of the case at bar.
Over the past several years and with increasing frequency, the
bankruptcy courts have addressed the application of some nonlodestar
fee arrangements in bankruptcy. The following are examples of
alternative billing arrangements
which have been addressed by the
120
courts in recent years.
A.

PeriodicPostPetitionRetainer Payments-Knudsen retainers"

1. Mega Cases. Probably the leading case on innovative billing
methods in bankruptcy cases was In re Knudsen.121 In Knudsen the
United States trustee appealed an order authorizing a fee payment
procedure where professionals and the creditors' committee were to be
paid each month without prior court approval of billing statements.
Every three months, counsel intended to serve and file an application for
approval of the statements. The statements were to be paid promptly
by the debtor if found acceptable. If quarterly statements were not
timely filed, the debtor would not be required
to pay counsel until the
22
statements were approved by the court.1

118.
119.
120.
121.
9th Cir.
122.

In re Niover Bagels, Inc., 214 B.R. 291, 294 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1994).
See generally Litan & Salop, supra note 116, at 197.
United States Trustee v. Knudsen Corp. (In re Knudsen Corp.), 84 B.R. 668 (B.A.P.
1988).
Id. at 669-70.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

558

[Vol. 50

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, ("BAP")
acknowledging that the issue presented was one of first impression, was
compelled to "reconcile section 328's broad language which includes the
term 'retainer' with section 331's specific requirements including notice
and hearing. "123 The BAP read section 328(a)'s inclusion of the term
"retainer" as indicating that "in certain rare circumstances where
adequate safeguards are taken, a bankruptcy court may implement a fee
payment procedure such as the one used here."'24 The United States
trustee asserted, and the BAP agreed, that allowance and disbursement
of fees is permitted only in accordance with sections 330 and 331.125
However, the BAP did not find that those sections "prohibit the transfer
of funds to professionals prior to compliance with those sections." 26
"Section 328(a) specifically states that a bankruptcy court may authorize
a retainer as part of a compensation agreement. A retainer contemplates payment
of a lump sum at the beginning of a case or periodically
" 127
thereafter.

The BAP held that three critical factors must exist: (1) the fees must
not be finally allowed until an "application is filed; (2) an opportunity for
objection has been provided; and (3) the court has reviewed the
application."128
In affirming the trial court's decision, the BAP
identified four specific factual criteria: (1) the case is unusually large;
(2) an extended waiting period for payment would place an undue
hardship on counsel; (3) counsel can respond to any reassessment; and
(4) the fee129
retainer procedure is subject to a noticed hearing prior to any
payment.

Although the standards in Knudsen have been adopted by many
courts, the case has not received universal support. i0 For instance,
in In re Genline 13 1 the bankruptcy court cited the plain language of
section 331 in rejecting a Knudsen type fee arrangement. 3 2 The court
stated that section 331 only allows interim disbursements to profession-

123.
124.

Id. at 671.
Id.

125. Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 672-73. The Court in Knudsen acknowledged that in especially large

cases, "when counsel must wait an extended period for payment, counsel is essentially
compelled to finance the reorganization. This result is improper and may discourage
qualified practitioners from participating in bankruptcy cases; a result that is clearly
contrary to Congressional intent." Id. at 672.
130. See In re Genlime Group, 167 B.R. 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
131. Id. at 453.
132. Id. at 455.
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als "[after notice and a hearing."'
Consequently, the court concluded
that the debtor's proposed payments to professionals on a monthly basis
without prior notice to creditors and court approval were impermissible
under the Code.'
The court criticized the Knudsen court's finding
that the language of section 328, which provides for the employment of
professionals "'on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment,"
permits a court to ignore the unambiguous language of section 331
which requires "notice and a hearing' preceding disbursements to
professionals." 3 ' The court found that disbursements to the professionals were subject to section 331's requirements of notice and a
hearing prior to such disbursement.
2. Small Cases. Most of the opinions authorizing a Knudsen
retainer rely upon a "mega-case exception" and reject the arrangement
in middle market cases. 36 In fact, one of the specific criteria articulated in Knudsen was that the case be unusually large.'37 However, the
Code does not mandate
that periodic retainer payments are available
38
only in mega cases.
In the case of In re Niover Bagels, Inc.,"' a middle- market case, the
bankruptcy court was confronted with a request to approve the
employment of an accounting firm under a compensation arrangement
in which the "accountant would be paid his invoices on a monthly basis
in amount of $600 at an hourly rate of $175, not to exceed $7,200. "14°
The court declined to limit the use of the Knudsen type of fee arrangement to the mega- case. 4 1 The court rejected the line of cases limiting
the Knudsen retainer to mega-cases on the rationale that those cases'
holdings undermined the tight
reporting requirements of the United
1 42
States trustee and the court.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Knudsen, 84 B.R. 668 (finding that section 331 must be construed in
light of the language contained in section 328 which authorizes the employment of
professionals "on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a
retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a contingent fee basis.") (11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1994)).
136. In re Niover Bagels, Inc., 214 B.R. 291, 294 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
137. Knudsen, 84 B.R. at 672.
138. Niover Bagels, 214 B.R. at 294.
139. Id. at 291.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 295.
142. Id. at 294 (refusing to follow In re Shelley's, Inc., 91 B.R. 803 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988); In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 97 B.R. 736 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Pacific Forest
Indus., 95 B.R. 740 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)).
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The court reasoned that accountants' fee applications for standard
services are not usually objected to.'43 Furthermore, "[tihere is
nothing especially esoteric about reviewing monthly management
compilations, assisting management in preparing these compilations,
assisting and reviewing cash flow projections, monthly audits or in
preparing state and federal tax returns."'" Those services can be
performed for a flat monthly management compilations fee. 145 The
court criticized the United States trustee for requiring detailed monthly
operating reports from the debtor. At the same time, through its'
objection to the fee arrangement, the court created a barrier to
employing cost-efficient accountants for debtors choosing to prepare the
required operating reports. 4 6
This case provides a very expansive interpretation of Knudsen. It
opens up Knudsen fee arrangements to Chapter 11 cases of any size and,
in effect, ignores the criteria set forth by the BAP in Knudsen. This case
carefully considers the challenge courts face to develop cost-efficient case
administration strategies for small business cases and, in so doing,
provides a broad interpretation, of the possible fee arrangements that
may be used in bankruptcy cases of any size.
B.

Draw Down PrepetitionRetainer Without PriorApproval
In response to the holding in Knudsen and based upon dialogue with
both the Bench and the Bar, the United States trustee for the Central
District of California established the U.S. Trustee Guide to Applications
for Employment of Professionals and Treatment of Retainers of the
Central District of California ("Guide").'47 The Guide provides a broad
interpretation of the Knudsen holding, at least as related to prepetition
retainers.148 In short, the Guide "allow[s] for the dissipation of
prepetition retainers without prior order of the court and without
149
distinction as to the size of the case."

The Guide provides a procedural mechanism for professionals to draw
down retainer. 50 The professional must submit a fee statement, in the
form of a fee application, to the United States trustee on a monthly basis

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Lotus Properties LP, 200 B.R. 388, 398 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and serve it on the appropriate parties.15 1 The professional can
withdraw the amount reflected in the fee statement without an order,
pending the filing of the interim fee application after 120 days has
passed, if no party objects to the fee statement." 2 If there is an
objection, a hearing will be held. 5 ' The Guide explicitly states that
this procedure does not alleviate the professionals' requirement to file
interim fee applications every 120 days. When the retainer is drawn
down, the fee statement procedure cannot be used."
Just as in Niover, the size of the case should not be the determinative
factor in condoning or approving a particular fee arrangement. This
reflects the need to treat bankruptcy professionals like nonbankruptcy
professionals and limit artificial barriers to timely receipt of compensation, while still adhering to the stringent Code requirements for approval
of compensation.
C. Draw Down PrepetitionRetainer and Replenish Retainer Without
PriorApproval
A variation of the Knudsen approach, and the procedure established
by the United States Trustee in the Central District of California, was
approved by the bankruptcy court in In re Lotus PropertiesLP.'55 The
attorney for the debtor was paid a prepetition retainer of $7,500 with the
agreement that fees and costs incurred postpetition would be paid on an
ongoing basis. The debtor's attorney sought to have this agreement
approved by the bankruptcy court so the attorney could withdraw funds
from the pre- and postpetition retainer without filing a fee applica15 6
tion.
The United States trustee objected to counsel making draw downs
during the first four months of the case for any sum in excess of the
initial retainer primarily because the case was not a mega case and,
therefore, failed to meet the Knudsen criteria.'5 7 Furthermore, the
trustee alleged that prior to a draw down, professionals must have a
court order.5 8

151. Id. at 396. (The fee statement must be served upon the official creditors'
committee or, if no committee is appointed, on the twenty largest unsecured creditors, on
those parties who have requested special notice, and upon the United States trustee).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 398.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 397-98.
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The bankruptcy court found the exercise of a draw down procedure,
coupled with a fixed retainer ceiling, was consistent with the intent of
Knudsen and the United States Trustee Guidelines.159 The bankruptcy
court allowed the draw down procedure during the first four months
after the petition and set a minimum retainer of $25,000, a sum the
court found "would have been reasonably requested by counsel to
initially represent the debtor."6 °
However, the debtor was unable to fund such a retainer. Therefore,
the bankruptcy court reasoned that it was permissible to replenish this
retainer account. 1 ' The replenished amount was "to be treated as a
prepetition retainer, although received in postpetition increments."162
Any unused retainer amount after the four-month period would remain
63
in a trust account until the filing of the first fee application.'
However, if fees and expenses greatly exceeded the retainer amount
during the retainer period a fee application could be filed."8
D. Hourly Compensation and Use of PrePetitionRetainer
In the case of In re W & W ProtectionAgency, Inc.,165 the bankruptcy
court approved a hybrid type of fee arrangement.'6 6 The debtor's
attorney sought approval to be compensated on an hourly basis while,
at the same time, holding on to a so-called "evergreen" prepetition
retainer for payment upon counsel's final fee application. The United
States trustee objected and argued for a restrictive interpretation of
section 328(a). In the United States trustee's view, section 328(a) only
allowed courts to approve one of the enumerated examples of compensation therein. Even if the arrangement were approved, a draw down of
the prepetition retainer could be made only after a hearing and approval
of the court.167
The bankruptcy court considered "[s]ection 102(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that the word 'including' is not limiting and § 102(5)
which provides that the word 'or' is not exclusive."168 As such, the
court concluded that "under section 328(a), compensation on one of the
bases listed, or any combination of those bases is permissible so long as

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

165. In re W & W Protection Agency, Inc., 200 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
166. Id. at 623.
167. Id. at 622.
168. Id.
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the terms and conditions are ultimately determined to be 'reasonable.'"169 The court authorized the debtor's attorney to hold the
prepetition retainer in escrow towards payment against its final fee
application, or until such time as the court determined otherwise. 7 °
E. FlatFee In Small Chapter 11 Cases
Flat fees are customary in Chapter 13 cases 7 ' and are not uncommon in cases under Chapter 12. Flat fees work in Chapter 13 cases
72
because most are routine, and the services required are predictable.
Courts approve thousands of Chapter 13 fee requests each year and can
easily gauge the value of an attorney's services in most cases.
In an apparent case of first impression, In re Pineloch Enterprises,
Inc.,173 the court confronted the issue of extending flat fees from
Chapter 12 and 13 cases to a small business Chapter 11 case. The
bankruptcy court concluded that "[Slmall [Blusiness chapter 11 cases
generally are more complicated tha[n] those in Chapter 13, but not to
the degree that would inhibit the use of flat fees." 74 The bankruptcy
court approved a flat fee of $5,000 at the outset of the case; however, the
fee had to "be held in the attorney's trust account until it [was] approved
by the court and... earned by counsel." 75
The court set an admittedly arbitrary schedule of when the fee was
earned. The court allowed:

169. Id. at 623.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 5 and 64.
172. See supra notes 5 and 64.
173. In re Pineloch Enters., Inc., 192 B.R. 675 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996).
174. Id. at 678.
175. Id. at 679 (aligning with the majority rule "that all retainers, whether general
retainers, flat fee retainers, advance fee nonrefundable retainers, or advance fee security
retainers, must be held in trust pending court approval.") (citing In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R.
212 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (prepetition "earned" retainers are unreasonable in bankruptcy
as they nullify Code protections, therefore such retainers remain property of the estate
required to be held in trust by counsel and may be drawn against only with court
approval); In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)
(terms of retainer are determined by statute and court's discretion regardless of agreement
of counsel and client); In re Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116 B.R. 208 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1990) ($50,000 "earned in full" retainer was advance fee retainer and had to be kept in
trust); In re Independent Sales Corp., 73 B.R. 772, 774-75 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987)
(prepetition general retainers must be held in trust to extent they are for services during
pendency of case); In re Doors and More, Inc., 127 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991)
(where $4,000 retainer was not held in trust, all fees were denied); but cf In re McDonald
Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
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one third of the flat fee to be earned when counsel attends the meeting
of creditors, one third when the plan and disclosure statement are filed
and the disclosure statement conditionally approved, and one third
when the plan is confirmed. If the plan is not confirmed, counsel may
apply for the balance any time after the confirmation hearing.'
The court found there was "no reason why [it] cannot establish the
amount of the flat fee at the beginning of the case after notice has been
given to all creditors pursuant to § 330(a)(1) and [Rules] 2002(a)(7),
2002(c)(2), and 2016(a)."' 77 In fact, several practical reasons supported
the approval of flat fees in Chapter 11 cases. For example, administrative costs can be predicted accurately with flat fees, and this predictability acts as an inducement for the debtor's attorney to quickly facilitate a
case to reorganization. 7 '
The bankruptcy court also recognized that the flat fee provides two
important advantages to attorneys. 17' The flat fee eliminates the delay
in compensation a professional must incur. Under the flat fee arrange180
ment, the professional does not have to file detailed time records.
Furthermore, if the flat fee is later determined to be "improvident in
light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the
fixing of such terms and conditions," the fee can be adjusted under
section 328(a).' s1
F

Flat Fee In Mega-Chapter11 Cases
In a unique experiment departing from the usual hourly rate billing
procedure used in large cases, Judge Robert J. Newsome, in In re Home
Express, Inc.,"12 recently offered an alternative means of arriving at a
reasonable fee in large cases, specifically, a flat fee. In Home Express,
shortly after appointment of counsel for the debtor, counsel indicated
"that the key professionals intended to file an application to establish
interim compensation procedures consistent with In re Knudsen.""
In response, Judge Newsome advised the parties that, in his view, the
fee process under section 330 in mega cases was "too burdensome for the

176. Pineloch Enters., 192 B.R. at 678.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The elimination of filing fee applications as required by Rule 2016 is suspect.
See supra note 54.
181. 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1994).
182. In re Home Express Inc., 213 B.R. 162 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997).
183. Id. (citing In re Knudsen, 84 B.R. 668 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)).
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court to administer without assistance and somewhat questionable in its
efficacy."" 84
Judge Newsome proposed "that the professionals either could agree to
a flat rate for all of their services in this case or, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 706, [he] would appoint [an] expert to review the time
sheets and otherwise assist the [court] in the fee-setting process."" 5
Under the flat fee arrangement, the professionals were required to
submit an analysis of the time necessary for the services to be rendered,
a comparison of fees approved in similar cases, and the aggregate
amount of fees to be sought in the case. 6
The professionals voiced concerns about matters they could not
reasonably anticipate to arise and opponents who might try to take
advantage of the limitations on their fees. However, Judge Newsome
responded that "most Chapter 11 cases are filled with surprises, both
good and bad, and that they should build such contingencies into their
flat fee.""8 '
Furthermore, the court noted, section 328(a) allows
modification
of
the approved fee if a remarkable event arises in the
88
case.1
The professionals chose the flat fee option and thereafter proposed a
flat fee based on less than the entire case. Judge Newsome held a flat
fee based on less than the entire case was unsatisfactory because
professionals may obtain a windfall by delaying claims objections and
other matters post-confirmation.'
The professionals then made
projections based on the case lasting twelve months and included all
work necessary to fully administer the Chapter 11.' 9
The court adjusted some of the numbers downward. For instance, the
court found that two hundred hours reserved for work on employment
applications was excessive. The time allotted for preparation of fee
applications was all but eliminated because the only application
contemplated would be for a final fee order at the end of the case, which
allowed the amounts already paid. The proposed blended hourly rates
were also reduced based upon the court's observations of what other
professionals in the area charged in comparable cases.1 9' Thereafter,

184. 213 B.R. at 165.
185. Id.
186.

Id.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 166.
191. Id.
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the court set proposed flat fees 92 and provided for the draw of such
fees on a monthly basis.'98 The proposed flat fees "did not include
expenses, which were to be monitored by the debtor's accounting staff
pursuant to the court's published fee and expense guidelines."'
After arriving at the proposed flat fees, the court directed the debtor
and the creditor's committe chairperson to submit a sworn statement of
position regarding the proposed flat fee and all parties in interest be
provided notice and an opportunity to object to the flat fee. 195. Additionally, on the United States trustee's request, the court directed the
professionals to provide the United States trustee with an invoice and
time sheets for the fees received each month.'
The court then
entered197an order approving the flat fee arrangement under section
328(a).

Interestingly, after the careful projections and several hearings at the
outset of the case, the professionals requested additional fees later in the
case based on certain circumstances the professionals argued were
unanticipatable at the time of the court's approval of the flat fee. 98
The court considered the merits of the request for modification of the flat
fees under the standard set forth in section 328(a) and granted a
modification in part.'
This case is an excellent example of the correct use of section 328(a).
Judge Newsome carefully considered the proposed flat fees at the
beginning of the case and made a reasonableness determination at that
time. All parties were given an opportunity to be heard on the proposed
flat fee. Thereafter, Judge Newsome approved the flat fee under section
328(a). Later in the case, upon appropriate motion, Judge Newsome
correctly applied the standard set forth in section 328(a) for modification
of a preapproved fee arrangement under section 328(a). 0 °

192. See id. The court set the following flat fees for the entire case: Wright, Robinson/Kaufman & Logan - $860,000; Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon - $564,375; Gray,
Cary, Ware & Freidenrich - $215,000; BDO Seidman - $300,000; Deloitte & Touche -

$150,000).
193. Each of the firms were to receive a draw on these flat fees in the following
amounts: Wright, Robinson/Kaufman & Logan - $75,000 per month; Bronson, Bronson
& McKinnon - $45,000 per month; Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich - $20,000 per month;
BDO Seidman - $30,000 per month; Deloitte & Touche - $20,000 per month. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Id. at 167.
200. See id.
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Beyond the excellent technical application of section 328(a) in the
Home Express case, Judge Newsome recognized the tremendous benefit
of experimenting with nonlodestar fee arrangements. In a case the size
of Home Express, with professional fees into the millions of dollars, the
resources of the court and ultimately the estate, through appointment
of an expert to review the time records, would have been unduly drained
to comply with the traditional lodestar fee process. Although considerable time and several hearings were required to set the flat fees,
certainly it was much more efficient than a review of the voluminous fee
applications which would have been filed in the case.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that nothing is certain in the fee compensation area.
While the lodestar method for fee arrangement is useful because, on its
face, it is easily applied, it carries several inherent problems such as
unpredictability and undesirability. Recognizing the problems associated
with lodestar fee arrangements and the need to have bankruptcy
professionals compensated similarly to those professionals outside of
bankruptcy, Congress enacted section 328. Section 328 provides a useful
mechanism by which professionals can be reasonably certain that their
fee contracts will be supported by the court and approved at the fee
application process. To obtain the benefit of section 328, however,
requires prior approval of the terms of the fee contract, which in turn
usually requires some type of reasonableness test. Without prior
approval, courts must use a reasonableness standard under section 330,
leaving counsel with only a general idea of whether their fee will be
approved. Section 328 provides professionals with greater assurance
that the preapproved terms will be enforced, and that only in an
improvident situation will those terms be disturbed. Professionals
employed under section 328 should beware of courts using the reasonableness standard instead of the improvidence standard. Because courts
have inherently imposed a reasonableness standard since the beginning
of the fee application process, it is, and will be, difficult for courts to
utilize a standard other than reasonableness. Professionals are
encouraged to receive an employment order under section 328 that is as
specific as possible. This will leave courts little room to maneuver when
the fee application is eventually filed.

